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Case No. 20080631-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
DEON LOMAX CLOPTEN, 
Defendant/ Petitioner. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its decision in State v. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205,186 P.3d 1004 
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Should a timely request for expert testimony regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identification be presumed admissible? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f^ 9, 22 P.3d 
1242. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate 
standard of review." Id. 
"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness 
identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ 43, 27 P.3d 1133. Under this standard, 
the appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony absent an abuse of discretion, that is, "'unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability/" State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, | 66, 44 P.3d 
794 (quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL RULES 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, is relevant to a determination of this 
case. The text of that provision, as it appeared at the time of trial, is reproduced 
in Addenda B. The amended provision, effective November 1, 2007, is also 
reproduced in Addendum B, together with the Advisory Committee Note. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury found the defendant, Deon Clopten, guilty of murder, a first 
degree felony, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony. R. 609-11. The trial court found him guilty of the bifurcated charge of 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony. R. 572-73. 
The court sentenced Clopten to consecutive prison terms of five-years-to-life for 
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murder, zero-to-five-years for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, 
and one-to-fifteen years for possession of a firearm by a restricted person. R. 
612-14. Clopten appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed his convictions. See 
Clopten, 2008 UT App 205. This Court granted certiorari review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of December 1,2002, Tony Fuailemaa took his girlfriend, 
Shannon Pantoja, to a gangster rap concert at a nightclub in Salt Lake City. R. 
645: 31-32. When the couple walked into the club, they passed a group of four 
men—Deon Clopten, his cousin Freddie White, Brandon Grissett, and Grissett's 
brother Andre Hamby. R. 645: 34. Clopten was wearing a red hooded 
sweatshirt and red sweatpants. R. 645:36; R. 646:199,206,213,218,234-35,246-
47; SE9. White was wearing a red T-shirt and navy blue or black pants, "like 
Dickies or Levis." R. 645:84; R. 646:213,218,235,237; SE7. Grissett and Hamby 
were wearing earth tone, button-down plaid shirts, with no red. R. 646: 218, 
235; SE8; SE10. 
When Fuailemaa and Pantoja walked into the club, Grissett, a prior 
acquaintance of Pantoja, exchanged greetings with her. R. 645: 34. Clopten was 
facing away from the couple when they entered, but turned and looked at 
Pantoja "right in the face/' R. 645: 35, 64, 66, 95, 99. Fuailemaa asked if she 
knew the men, but Pantoja told him that she knew only Grissett. R. 645: 35-36, 
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65,100. Fuailemaa asked if she knew "[t]he guy all flamed up" in red, "Deon 
Clopten." R. 645:35-36.l When Pantoja said that she did not, Fuailemaa told her 
that Clopten "had some problems with some of the homies out in the prison." 
R. 645: 36. 
Several undercover officers from the Metro Gang Unit were monitoring 
activity at the concert, including Officer Saul Bailey, who knew Pantoja. R. 645: 
45,103-04,147-48; R. 646:191,194-95. While monitoring the crowd as they filed 
into the club, Bailey and another officer noticed Clopten, who "seemed to stand 
out" because he was "wearing a red kind of jumpsuit, red sweatpants and a red 
sweatshirt." R. 645: 105. The two officers recognized Clopten, but could not 
recall his name. R. 645:105-06, R. 646:210. As the concert was drawing to an 
end, an officer observed "some sort of [non-verbal] confrontation" between 
Clopten's group and a group that included Fuailemaa, but it ended without 
incident when one of the two groups walked away. R. 645:107-11. 
Fuailemaa and Pantoja left the concert early to avoid the rush. R. 645:37. 
As they walked back to their car, Pantoja saw the three men who she had seen 
with Clopten earlier that evening "kind of like hiding behind — crouched behind 
the building. . . . [A]ll three peeked out and then immediately ducked back 
1
 When Fuailemaa told Pantoja Clopten's name, she mistook Clopten's 
name as "Compton." R. 645: 35-36, 53-54,100. 
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again/7 R. 645: 38. On seeing the men, the couple stopped walking and 
Fuailemaa said to Pantoja, "I think I'm going to have some problems with these 
guys." R. 645: 38-39. Pantoja stepped back a few feet and urged Fuailemaa to 
go back, but he refused. R. 645: 39-40. Clopten then emerged from a recessed 
doorway, holding a small, black handgun with his arm fully extended. R. 645: 
40, 43, 72, 81; see SE2. Pantoja yelled, "Baby, look out!" R. 645: 40, 73. But just 
as Fuailemaa turned to look, Clopten said, "What's up now, Homie?" and 
fatally shot Fuailemaa twice in the back of the head. R. 645: 40, 43-44, 73. 
After Fuailemaa dropped to the ground, Clopten fired another shot and 
fled toward his friends and the parking lot to the east. R. 645: 44-45. Officer 
Bailey was near the club when he heard the gunshots. R. 646:192,194. He ran 
around the corner, saw Pantoja kneeling down next to Fuailemaa, and asked the 
hysterical Pantoja "who did it." R. 645:45-46; R. 646:192,194. Pantoja pointed 
east and answered, "It's the guy in all red." R. 645:46; R. 646:195. Officer Bailey 
looked up and saw a man clad in all red running eastbound, just beginning to 
round a corner midway through the block. R. 646:195-97, 227. 
Officer Bailey pursued the red-clad man into a parking lot, where he got 
into a Ford Explorer and began to exit. R. 646:196-97. Bailey drew his weapon, 
identified himself, and ordered the driver to stop. R. 646: 199-201. Bailey 
recognized the driver as the same man he had seen earlier that night dressed in 
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all red. R. 646:198-99. Clopten looked at Bailey briefly, and then accelerated out 
of the parking lot. R. 646:199-202. Officers in vehicles immediately picked up 
the pursuit, and after a high speed chase, stopped Clopten and the other three 
men at an exit ramp on 1-15. R. 645:113-21,154-55. 
After police apprehended Clopten and the other three men, Officer Bailey 
rode with Pantoja to the location of the stop for a show-up identification. R. 645: 
50-51; R. 646: 207-08. Bailey explained that they had stopped "some guys" and 
told her that they "need[ed] her to go identify [them], see if they're the ones/ ' R. 
645: 50. During the ride to the show-up, Pantoja identified the gunman by 
name, telling Officer Bailey that "Deon Compton" was the shooter. R. 646: 209-
10. Once Pantoja gave the shooter's name, Bailey immediately recalled that it 
was Deon Clopten that he had seen earlier dressed in all red. R. 646: 210-11. 
Using flood lights, the men were presented to Pantoja one by one from a 
distance of about 25 feet, starting with Clopten. R. 645: 51-53. Pantoja 
immediately recognized Clopten as the shooter and said, "That's the one." R. 
645: 52. She identified White as one of the three men ducking behind the 
building just prior to the shooting. R. 645: 54. She also identified the other two 
men with Clopten that night—Grissett and Hamby. R. 645: 54-55. At a lineup a 
year later, Pantoja again identified Clopten as the shooter. Id. at 57-59. 
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Melissa Valdez, another concert attendee, also witnessed the shooting. 
Before the concert, Valdez talked with a group of men about getting tickets, one 
of whom was dressed in all red. R. 646:243-44,246-47. After leaving the concert 
early, she passed the same man dressed in all red she had spoke with earlier that 
evening. R. 646: 245-46,247. Recognizing him from their earlier encounter, she 
asked if he had gotten into the club. He responded, "yeah," but appeared "very 
cold, like a man on a mission." R. 646:246-48. After passing him, Valdez looked 
over her shoulder in time to see the red-clad man shoot Fuailemaa in the back of 
the head. R. 646: 249. Valdez later identified Clopten as the shooter from two 
photo arrays. R. 646: 254-56. 
Christopher Hamby also fingered Qopten as the shooter. R. 633: 23. 
Hamby testified at the preliminary hearing, see R. 633, but could not be found to 
testify at trial. R. 646: 318-22. The trial court declared him unavailable and his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing was read to the jury. R. 646: 318-22. 
Hamby confirmed that Fuailemaa and Clopten had a "commotion" in the 
club earlier that evening. R. 633 21. He said that when the four men returned to 
their car after leaving the concert, Clopten angrily declared that he was "goin7 to 
shoot [Fuailemaa]" and secured a 9 mm semi-automatic pistol from Freddie 
The transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony is attached to the 
trial transcript at R. 646. The State will cite to those portions as R. 633. 
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White. R. 633: 23,47-48, 59. Hamby said that White also armed himself with a 
gun. R. 633: 48-49. Hamby testified that Clopten then walked back toward the 
club, followed by Hamby, Wliite, and Grissett. R. 633: 23, 59. Hamby testified 
that after he and the other two men fell back a short distance away, Clopten 
approached Fuailemaa and his girlfriend, threw on his hood, "and, at point-
blank range,. . . shot [Fuailemaa] in the back of the head/7 R. 633: 23,26-30,50-
52; SE45. 
Hamby also testified that as the four men fled in the Ford Explorer, 
Clopten gave White the gun and White tossed it out of the window. R. 633: 33-
34, 58-59. Police later recovered a Hi-Point 9 mm handgun and a Bersa .380 
handgun, which a bicyclist had found along the escape route. R. 645: 162-63, 
169-76. A ballistics test confirmed that the shell casings and bullet fragments 
recovered at the scene of the murder were fired from the 9 mm handgun. R. 
646: 377-80. 
Following his arrest, Clopten was taken to the Utah State Prison. R. 646: 
342. There, he spoke with Robert Land, an inmate who had been in prison with 
both Clopten and Fuailemaa in 1997. R. 646: 347-50. Land explained that 
Clopten considered Fuailemaa an enemy because he had jumped Clopten 
during a fight at the prison in 1997. R. 646: 347-51. He testified that after 
Clopten was imprisoned following his arrest for Fuailemaa's murder, Clopten 
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told him \\ hiit had happened. Confirming the observations of police officers 
and Hamby, Clopten told Land that he and Fuailemaa confronted each other 
earlier that lu^ht at tin Jul I it4o -In ' Jopten said that dunn*; lli<> 
* onf ion tain u i lit- t» >1 J I naileniaa Ih il h*1 iHk i e,o tall his mi nil her a use ih il s 
the last time hel l talk to her." R. 646: 346. Clopten told Land that he domed" 
Fuailemaa after he left the concert. R. 646: 352.3 He also told Land that Ihey 
threw the guns out the window during the high-speed chase. R. 646: 353. 
• * • * * 
Prior to trial, the defense gave notice of its intention to call as an expert 
witness Dr Da\ id IL Dodd, an associate professor of psychology at the 
University ot I taJ i K Jb JoS. 1 he defense wished to elicit testimony from 1 )r 
I )odd jegai ilji)^ the fat t )r-> thai R^tairh I ids sin » u i u i \ intliu IK e the a< i in it \ 
of ^ P W I I I V s identifications, spmfiralh Ilia efforts of traurn i weapon u^a 
cross-racial identification, and suggestive influences such as show-ups and 
police commentary. R. 259-64; R. 639: 7-10. The State objected. R. 296-303,470-
74 After considering and re-considering the proffered testimony, the trial court 
UiiJuJed Lluillho t'sLimoih ] i ul I I1' supeilliuuis to the aulionan juu 
insli in tn>n 11 *M < \\ itna^s identilu at ion dint y ul 1 11 i\ •* n<> 1>P<H in > m i 111 
jury's decision.' R. 544. 12-14. 
1 and explained that to dome someone means to "[^jhoot him m Lite 
head." R. 646: 352. 
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court's exclusion 
of the proffered expert testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, ^ 13-21. After noting the problems associated with 
eyewitness identifications, the court of appeals observed that Defendant did not 
object to the subject matter of the instruction given on eyewitness identification. 
Id. at \ 16 & n.4. Then, relying on precedent from this Court, it held that 
"'expert testimony [on eyewitness identification] is the type of lecture testimony 
that, in cases such as these, can be adequately conveyed to the jury through an 
instruction/" Id. at ^ 18 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, | 19, 48 P.3d 
953)). The court of appeals held that "the trial court did not exceed its 
discretion" in concluding that under the circumstances of the case, the 
cautionary jury instruction was sufficient. Id. at ^ 21. 
The court of appeals also concluded that even if the expert testimony 
should have been admitted, its exclusion was harmless, noting that Defendant's 
associate, Andre Hamby, fingered him as the shooter, and that the other two 
witnesses were also not complete strangers to Defendant. Id. at \ 20. 
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SUMM * -x l ' :* ? *H N IT . . 
Defendant invites this Court to "chart a different course" by creating a 
presumption of admissibility for expert testimony on eyewitness identification. 
No court has ujuptea SUCH an approach, nor should ^.;s L^jrt. ii:> Court 
should adhei e to 1:1 i.e ab u se of discretion standai d applied Ii i. al 1 otl lei cases 
involving expert testimony. Like other export testimony, tho .idmis^ibilih \ if 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly governed by rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. When applied to the facts of this case, the court of 
appeals correctly concluded that the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony 
w as i lot an, abuse of discretion t, ' 
Tht> M.itn did not challenge the inherei it reliability I the scientific 
< > 
principles underlying Dr. Dodd's proffered testimony. Accordingly, the first 
Rimmasch requirement was satisfied. Defendant conceded that Dr. Dodd could 
not comment on the witness's credibility in identifying him. However, under 
current law, the court of appeals correctly concluded that because the testimony 
\ • 'ould be in the nat lire of a lect Lire to tl i..e ji i :i y, ti i.e ti ial court did i lot abuse its 
discretion in relying instead on cautionary jury instructions to educate the jury 
on the fallibilities of eyewitness identification. Finally, given the cautionary jury 
instruction, as well as the quality of the other evidence presented at trial, the 
proffered expert testimony was not, on balance, helpful to the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
A TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION IN ADMITTING OR 
EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION IS PROPERLY GOVERNED BY UTAH 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 
Like all other expert testimony, the admissibility of expert testimony on 
factors that may influence the reliability of eyewitness identifications is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, f 66, 44 
P.3d 794 (citing State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993)). That discretion, 
as in all other cases involving expert testimony, is properly governed by Rule 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. at f 69 (citing Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361). 
k k k 
On certiorari, Defendant asks the Court to abandon it current abuse of 
discretion approach and "chart a different course/' Pet. Brf. at 16, 21. 
Specifically, he invites the Court "to adopt an evidentiary presumption" that 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification "will assist the trier of fact" under 
rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence," [wjhenever the State introduces testimony of 
an eyewitness" to prove a defendant's identity. Pet. Brf. at 21,16,27-32. Under 
Defendant's approach, a trial court would be required to admit such testimony 
"unless the State can rebut this presumption" by showing, for example, that "a 
long-standing relationship [existed] between the eyewitness and the 
perpetrator" or that "the crime scene was well lit and the eyewitness viewed the 
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perpetrator for a substantial period of time under circumstances where mistake 
is unlikely." Pet. Brf. at 16, 32. 
This Court siiOLii-; Jecime defendant > in; nation, i ie aid not seek SUL ^  a 
departui e at trial or i i i. the :oiii I: of appeals. \nd as acknow ledged ii :t,1 ds brief, 
s^ r Pet, Brf ;if ^ no ^onrt in lbir- rountrv h^s ar'opt'vl -utli ,iii ippr^ |i 1], p* i m 
should this Coun. .: is inconsistent with both this Court's long-established 
precedent and rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
4, This Court has appropriately addressed the problems associated 
with eyewitness identifications. 
1. State v. Lrirj. 
Prior to 1986, the decisions whether to allow expert testimony or rrr-'c-
. .._ nonary iury instructions on ::)•: :^L'A:HJW ni eyewitness identification were 
:
-
i f
 * • -• -
 :
 scretion of their* * - 1 n isi r, 649P 2d 56, 61 (I Jt h 
1982). But in State v. Long, this Court "abandoned its] discretionary approach to 
cautionary jury instructions." 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986). After reviewing 
the body of research showing both the inherent weaknesses in eyewitness 
identification am; :he general lack of awareness of these weaknesses by jurors, 
1 1 te Coi :i it cc i icluded 'tl iat, i it a n rii limu in , additions il ji idicial g uidance to tl i,. B 
jury in evaluating [eyewitness] testimony is warranted, id. at 4SS. i'-P "= '• 
Court thus directed that in future cases, "trial courts shall give [a cautionan 1 
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instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and 
such an instruction is requested by the defense/' Id. at 492. 
Long held that "a proper instruction should sensitize the jury to the factors 
that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those that laypersons most 
likely would not appreciate/7 Id. The Court held that such an instruction 
"should include not only the externals, like the quality of the lighting and the 
time available for observation, but also the internal or subjective factors, such as 
the likelihood of accurate perception, storage and retrieval of the information by 
a witness/' Id. at 492-93. The Court held that such an instruction should 
instruct jurors to consider, among other things, "whether [the identification] was 
the product of suggestion/' as well as "the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly." Id. at 493. The Court held that" [tjhis last area includes such factors 
as whether the event was an ordinary one . . ., and whether the race of the actor 
was the same as the observer's." Id. 
The Court examined two instructions designed to address the factors 
affecting eyewitness identifications. Id. at 494. Although Long concluded that 
the instruction identified in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
would be adequate "under most circumstances," it criticized the Telfaire 
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instruction because it fails to cover several important factors and "incorporates 
some . . . fallacious assumptions'7 about eyewitness identification. Long, 721 
I \2d at 494. I 'he Court commended an instruction proposed in the American 
Jou nial of Crim ii i,.al I a/v\ , as [aJ n 101 e coixiplete ii istr uction tlia.ti eniedies i i lai ly 
of the problems < !" *'h - ^  X;;;-. ::W^\] '!:; -• ' • W-Q" \ •• -- ' \ : :-
is now commonly referred to as the Long instruction. However, the Court 
refused to adopt it or any other instruction "as the only acceptable formulation." 
.</. at 4-C e Court opted in?tend to permit "trial court[s] and counsel some 
.r:^.;_ .:i. . : ciung instruction .-.. i satisfy the concerns expressed' in its 
;• - P - ' • • \ : - ; • - - - - - - " V - — "Id i nl ' 4 9 2 195.
 : ; • • 
Jurisprudence on eyewitness identification experts. 
" [ I ]his [C]ourt has not extended the cautionary instruction requirement 
/.v.j .• ^ M I L - . L : / p j i i i^cimony concerning eyewitness 
identification '" Sink - v Btifh >rfield 2001 I ] 1 59 1"j  42, 27 I > . 3< 1 1 1 33 (citation 
omitted). Rather, the Court has adhered to the traditional "abuse of discretion" 
standard applied in other cases involving expert testimony. The Court has thus 
held that"' [t]he trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility 
or expert testimony' ' ' on eyewitness identification, and that '"such decisions are 
reviewed m-nl^r an abtoe »»f d^nvtiun -landcird " / ' '//'", V'^2 'M '"', f|| ihn 
(quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361); accord State v. Hubbard. 20Pn r I : • « $ 
P.3d 953 ("sound discretion"); Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ 1f 28, 43 ("considerable 
discretion" and "sound discretion"); Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982) 
("discretion"); State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981) ("discretion"). 
Under this standard, the Court has held that it will not reverse a trial 
court's decision on the admissibility of expert testimony "absent a clear showing 
of abuse." Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). The Court has 
held that such a showing is made only if the trial court's decision "'exceeds the 
limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ]f 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 
1361). "'[T]he appellate court can properly find abuse only if.. . no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Brown, 948 
P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978)); accord Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at \ 28. This standard recognizes that a 
trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony "'necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 340 (citation omitted) 
(quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887); accord Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at f 28. 
A trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification has been challenged in this Court in five cases: Griffin, Malmrose, 
Butterfield, Hollen, and Hubbard? In affirming the trial courts' decisions to 
4
 This Court addressed a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony a sixth 
time in State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, 63 P.3d 621. However, the fractured 
opinion did not garner a majority on the issue. 
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exclude the expert testimony, two principles have emerged: (1) expert testimony 
may not evaluate the reliability of a particular eyewitness; and (2) expert 
testimony must assist the trier of fact. 
.. .. .^.«^.V-J V\J*Z :r^ Lri.u . yji: ,; : not ^ouse its 
discretion Ii t. excludi ng proffered expert testiii iony, because tl le j: coffered 
testimony would ''evaluate the credibility of the si; re's w'in'1^. -
identification of the defendants/7 Griffin, 626 P.2d at 481. In other words, it 
would be no more than "a lecture from a psychologist as to the credibility of 
evidence. ,
 s.. i r< </ Court held that" [t]he question of credibility of the testimony 
as to * -./;..;<'; eT :i.T . ' •': e OK ie:•....:;;- ^ ..-:.•: ..vj}ir;\ 10 determine. 
649 P.2d at ol; Butter field, 2001 UT 59, t 43. The Court in Hubbard distilled the 
principle expressed in Griffin, Malmrose, and Butterfield to its essence: " [I]t is the 
role of the jury to decide how much weight to give particular witnesses, not the 
role of independent experts. Hubbard, 20U2 UT 4:\ j^ 1 ;>. 1 he Court thus held 
Hunt such teslimonv mav properly be excluded i! it ' \\ ill evaluate tor Hie ]ury, 
either directly or indirectly, to what extent me eerei^Tre *.v:!--..'^  le-err-ony 
should be believed/7 Id. at ^\]\ 15,17. 
The Court has also examined a trial court's decision to exclude expert 
testimony in terms of whether the proffered testimony would assist the jury. 
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For example, in Griffin, the Court also upheld the trial court's exclusion of the 
expert testimony because i t" would apply to any crime or any trial" and "people 
of ordinary intelligence and experience" were capable of judging the credibility 
of an eyewitness for themselves. Griffin, 626 P.2d at 481. Since Long, the focus 
on helpfulness has been even greater. Although rule 702 is not always 
mentioned in its post-Long opinions, the Court's analysis has been consistent 
with that rule. For example, in Butterficld, the Court concluded that the expert 
testimony was not necessary, because the Long instruction "adequately and 
thoroughly explained] how to evaluate eyewitness identifications presented at 
trial." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, *[[ 44. A similar conclusion was reached in 
Hubbard. See 2002 UT 45, \ \ 18-20. 
Hollen also upheld the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony on 
helpfulness grounds, but for a different reason. In Hollen, the trial court allowed 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, % 67. The 
expert "gave extensive testimony on factors that affect the reliability of 
identifications," and was even allowed to evaluate factors that in his opinion 
influenced the eyewitnesses' ability to accurately identify the perpetrator. Id.5 
However, the trial court did not permit the expert to "opin[e] as to the overall 
5
 It appears that such testimony could have been excluded under Hubbard 
because it was "evaluating] for the jury . . . to what extent the percipient 
witness[es] should be believed." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, f 15. 
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reliability of the process of identification" in that case. Id. at r^t 67, 70 & n."\ 
Citing rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court held that given the expert 
testimony already given, "the jury could, form,,, a, conclusion regarding the overall 
reliability o) the Kientiiiidtjuns n illmut furthej dssistani t-v Id / ' •. •• •. 
B. ' I he trial court's discretion in determining whether to admit 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification is governed by 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Expert testimony on eyewitness identification primarily rests on J .; i> Deis-.- a 
researcl I desigi ted to assess tl i„e cause-and-effect relatioi iship an long \ ariables 
Memon, and Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 
7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45,49-51 (2007) (" Wells, Memon, & 
Penrod"). Such testimony thus falls squarely "within the scope of rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules ,;i LYjCtence," even thougr. :: :.- . .r :-,.,.: 
testin IOP* •'.'". ;i; **•*• <bergei , . ' f ^ ; ' -u f J •-" " ~l i •!"" • - U i^lv, 
^ uvr-ested in Hollen, the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, at f 
69; accord Maestas, 2002 UT 123, %<h 70-76 (opinion of Durrant, J., joined by 
^ ^ ^ pj£ scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
-1 9-
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702(a).6 Before expert testimony based on scientific evidence may 
be admitted, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy a three-prong test. See 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). The proponent of the testimony 
must demonstrate that: (1) "the scientific principles and techniques underlying 
the expert's testimony are inherently reliable/' (2) "the scientific principles or 
techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case 
by sufficiently qualified experts/' and (3) the evidence is otherwise admissible 
under "rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,641 
(Utah 1996). The burden of persuasion rests on the proponent of the evidence. 
See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396, 407. 
This Court has explained that this standard for admission of expert 
testimony "is necessary because science in the court is a two-edged sword. 
While often helpful, scientific testimony also has the potential to overawe and 
confuse, and even to be misused for that purpose." Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 
6
 The introductory clause of rule 702(a) now reads, "Subject to the 
limitations in subjection (b)." However, that clause was not part of the rule at 
the time of trial, but was added in the November 1,2007 amendment. The 2007 
amendment also added subsections (b) and (c). Both the old and amended 
versions of rule 702 are included in Addendum B, as well as the Advisory 
Committee Note to the amended rule. 
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115, *f 56, 61 P.3d TOnS. This Court's "jurisprudential history [thus] reveals a 
consistent attempt to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence while 
alio wing a maximum, of relevant information io ; low to me linger or ::.u L 7. 
Defendant^ piopo^ed mle creating a presumption of ndmissibilih li-i expeit 
testimony oi i eyewitness identification flies in the face of thi s ji irispn idential 
history. 
The proponent of the expert testimony must first demonstrate 
that the scientific principles underlying the proffered 
testimony are inherently reliable. 
Under step one of the Rimmasch test, the proponent of expert testimony 
must demonstrate that "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the 
expert's testimony are inherently reliable." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. This may be 
accomplished in one of two ways: by the court taking judicial notice or through 
ai i. evidential y 1 learing i d. J i iclicial I lotice is appi opi iate if tl te scientific 
principles and techniques at issue hav e been generally recognized and accepted 
by the legal and scientific communities." Id. ii such a showing cannot be made, 
inherent reliability of the principles or techniques may still be established 
through an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
. n. ; . .;y o: rcs^^r^f: :n ;ne rioia OL ev'jwirness identification is extensive 
'-
 :
 • "'• --o * -:^e^:*:h • • S - ' * .— p.-v.; -ike 
judicial notice of its inherent reliability. Some general principles have emerged 
as a result of the psychological research. For example, we know that human 
perception and memory is not simply a matter of the recording and replaying of 
events. See Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, in Memory Observed: 
Remembering in Natural Contexts 214, 215 (Ulric Neisser & Ira E. Hyman, Jr. 
eds., 2nd ed. 1999). Rather, it is a "decision-making process[ ] affected by the 
totality of a person's abilities, background, attitudes, motives and beliefs, by the 
environment and by the way his [or her] recollection is eventually tested/7 Id. 
As such, it is subject to error. Id. at 214-15. 
However, errors in eyewitness identification generally cannot be traced to 
a single variable. They "represent a confluence of memory and social-influence 
variables that interact in complex ways." Wells, Memon, & Penrod, supra, at 45. 
As researchers continue to study the effects of different variables on eyewitness 
identification, their original theories can be discredited, explained, or modified. 
One such example is the research on the correlation between witness 
confidence and identification accuracy ("CA correlation"). In a 1980 survey of 
25 studies (meta-analysis) dating back to the early 1900s and involving 43 
assessments of the CA correlation, Kenneth A. Deffenbacher found "a 
significant positive [correlation" in 22 assessments and a "nonsignificant or 
reverse (negative) correlation[ ]" in 21 assessments. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, 
Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Tlieir 
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Relationship?, 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 243,245-46 (1980). The incongruent results 
led many to conclude that eyewitness confidence could not be a valid indicator 
of accuracy. See id.; Long, 721 P.2d at 490. 
Subsequent research, however, has generally found a positive CA 
correlation. In a 1980 meta-analysis of 16 studies, Penrod and Cutler found an 
average correlation of r=.23.7 Steven Penrod and Brian Cutler, "Witness 
Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation/' 1 Psychol., 
Pub. Pol'y & Law 817, 823 (1995) (first reported in Steven Penrod, Elizabeth 
Lof tus, and John Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A Psychological 
Perspective, in The Psychology of the Courtroom 119,155-56 (N. Kerr et al. eds. 
1982)). In a 1987 review of 35 studies involving 3,953 participants, Bothwell, 
Deffenbacher, and Brigham found an average correlation of r=.25. Id. (first 
reported in Robert K. Bothwell, Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, & J.C. Brigham, 
Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypotltesis Revisited, 
72 Journal of Applied Psychology 691-95 (1987)). And in a 1995 meta-analysis of 
7
 In these studies, the CA correlation is expressed in "r" units. Penrod & 
Cutler, supra, at 823. "If [jurors] know nothing about the[ ] witnesses, then 
[they] would have to guess whether each witness is correct or incorrect. Simple 
guessing should produce 50% correct guesses and 50% incorrect guesses and a 
corresponding r=0 . . . . On the other hand, if [jurors] had access to some very 
useful information [(in this case witness confidence)] and could use that 
information to correctly classify 80% of the witnesses (much better than 
guessing), the strength or usefulness of [that] information would be captured 
with r=.6 " Id. 
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30 studies involving 4,036 participants, Sporer, Penrod, Read, and Cutler 
preported an average correlation of .29. Id. at 824-25 (first reported in Siegfried 
Ludwig Sporer, Steven Penrod, Don Read, & Brian Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, 
and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness 
Identification Studies, 118 Psychological Bulletin 315, 319 (1995) (Sporer). 
We are thus left with CA correlations of .23, .25, and .29.8 Penrod and 
Cutler characterized these CA correlations as "weak" to "modest." Penrod & 
Cutler, supra, at 825,842. But Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham recognized 
that "even a correlation of .25 cannot be characterized as an effect of negligible 
size," but is "medium-size in nature." Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 
supra, at 693. And both Penrod and Wells have admitted the research suggests 
that "witnesses who are highly confident in their identifications are somewhat 
more likely to be correct as compared to witnesses who display little 
confidence." Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, R.S. Malpass, S.M. 
Fulero, & C.A.E. Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: 
8
 In a 1984 meta-analysis of 31 studies, Wells and Murray found an 
estimated correlation of r = .07. Penrod & Cutler, supra, at 823 (originally 
reported in Gary Wells and D.M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in Eyewitness 
Testimony: Psychological Perspectives, 155,161-62 (Wells, et al. eds., 1984)). The 
CA correlation of .07 found by Wells and Murray "is relatively useless in any 
applied sense." Wells & Murray, supra, at 162; accord Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & 
Brigham, supra, at 691. However, the methodology used by Wells & Murray has 
since been discredited by other researchers. See Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & 
Brigham, supra, at 691-92. 
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Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 622 
(1998). 
Sporer's 1995 meta-analysis shed additional light on the CA correlation. 
Unlike the previous research, Sporer also analyzed the difference in the CA 
correlation between choosers — those who identify a suspect—and 
nonchoosers —• those who make no identification. Sporer, supra, at 315-20. In the 
analysis, Sporer found that the CA correlation "was significantly higher for 
choosers ... than for nonchoosers ...." Penrod & Cutler, supra, at 824. For 
choosers, the average CA correlation was r=.41, and for nonchoosers, the CA 
correlation was only r=.12. Sporer, supra, at 319. As later explained by Penrod 
and Wells, "[t]he 'chooser7 versus 'nonchooser' distinction is a forensically 
important one, because it is 'choosers' (and defendants they choose) who 
typically appear in courtrooms." Wells, Small, Penrod, et al., supra, at 622-23. 
Other research has shown that confidence may harden or increase as a result of 
confirming feedback. See Wells, Memon, & Penrod, supra, at 66. 
As a result of this continuing research, "the American Psychology-Law 
Society's white paper on lineups [now] endorses the idea of making a clear 
record of the confidence of an eyewitness [at the time of identification] that 
triers of fact may later use." Id. at 65 (citing Wells, et a l , Eyewitness identification 
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Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 
603-47 (1998)). 
The point here is not to suggest that jurors should not be cautioned 
against over-reliance on eyewitness confidence. See, e.g., Sporer, supra, at 324. 
Rather, the point is that courts should not take judicial notice of the inherent 
reliability of the scientific principles upon which expert testimony is based. As 
explained in Rimmasch, "a very high level of reliability is required before judicial 
notice can be taken/' Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. Because what is "known" 
about the factors influencing eyewitness identification is ever evolving, the 
scientific principles derived from psychological research on eyewitness 
identification do not meet this burden. As a result, expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification should be subject to an evidentiary hearing to ensure 
that the scientific principles are inherently reliable in light of ongoing research. 
2. The proponent of the expert testimony must next 
demonstrate that there is an adequate foundation for the 
proffered testimony. 
Under step two of the Rimmasch test, the proponent of the expert 
testimony must establish "an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony." 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.7; Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. The Court has held that 
this step requires a showing that "the scientific principles or techniques have 
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been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by qualified persons and 
that the testimony is founded on that work/ ' Id. 
Although not referencing the second requirement of the Rimmasch test, 
this Court has rejected expert testimony on eyewitness identification in part 
because the expert was not familiar with the witnesses or the facts of the case 
and could not thereby offer an opinion as to whether the eyewitness 
identifications were accurate. See Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f 44; Hubbard, 2002 UT 
45, Tf 19. The Court has concluded that because such expert testimony could 
'"apply to any crime or any trial'" and '"would be in the nature of a lecture to 
the jury as to how they should judge the evidence/" the trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in excluding it, but may rely on Long instructions. 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59. at ^f 42-44 (quoting Griffin, 626 P.2d at 481). 
Indeed, an expert who testifies on the fallibilities of eyewitness 
identification is not like the expert who reaches a result or conclusion by 
applying accepted techniques or formulas to known factors. See, e.g., Kofford v. 
Flora, 7U P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987) (discussing admissibility of HLA tests for 
determining paternity). Nor is he or she like the expert who renders an opinion 
based on a clinical evaluation of the subject. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 
Tf^f 15-18, 5 P.3d 642 (discussing admissibility of psychologist's testimony 
regarding mental capacity of victim suffering from mental retardation). Indeed, 
-27-
the science does not support such extrapolation. " Rather, the [eyewitness] 
expert serves an educational function for the jury, presenting the general factors 
that increase or decrease the likelihood that the average witness will be correct in 
particular situations." John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman, & Christian A. 
Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific 
Issues, 36 Court Review 12, 22 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Since Defendant's trial in this case, the law appears to have shifted 
somewhat with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony that"outline[s] 
for the jury the general principles of psychological knowledge which illuminate 
the problems of eyewitness performance/' Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ 44. 
In State v. Rothlisberger, the State cirgued that rule 702 did not govern "fact 
testimony" based on specialized knowledge, only opinion testimony. 2006 UT 
49, f 13,147 P.3d 1176. The Court rejected the State's argument, holding that 
rule 702 applies "[w]hether the [expert] testimony . . . is in the form of fact or 
opinion." Id. at |^ 18. Quoting the advisory committee's note to federal rule 702, 
the Court explained that rule 702 "'recognizes that an expert on the stand may 
give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the 
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.'" Id. at \ 19 (quoting 
Fed. R. Evid 702, Advisory Comm. Note). 
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On November 1,2007, rule 702 was amended, adding subsections (b) and 
(c). The amendment itself appears to do no more than codify the threshold 
requirement of inherent reliability under step one of Rimmasch, as well as codify 
the alternative ways by which the requirement may be satisfied, i.e., through an 
evidentiary hearing or by judicial notice. See Utah R. Evid. 702. However, the 
advisory committee note mirrors the federal note regarding expert testimony on 
general principles: 
It might be important in some cases for an expert to educate the 
factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply 
these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes 
that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of 
principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply 
them to the facts. 
Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note. 
In sum, in light of Rothlisberger and the advisory committee note to the 
amended rule 702, the fact that an expert's testimony on eyewitness 
identification would be in the nature of a lecture to the jury does not appear to 
be a basis for exclusion, so long as the testimony does not "attempt[ ] to apply 
[the articulated] principles to the facts of the case/' Id. Application of the 
principles must still be left to the jury. Of course, the expert testimony must still 
be "founded on [the] work" established to be inherently reliable. Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d at 398 n.7. Id. 
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3. The proponent of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification must demonstrate that the proffered testimony 
is otherwise admissible under rule 403. 
Even where the scientific principles are found to be inherently reliable 
under steps one and two of the Rimmasch test, "expert testimony based upor 
[those principles] is not automatically entitled to admission/' Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d at 398 n.8. The court must then determine "whether, on balance, the 
evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact/' Id. As observed in Rimmasch, 
"[t]his determination requires the trial court under the guidance of rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence to balance the probativeness of the proffered 
testimony against the dangers its admission poses/' Id. 
Rimmasch explained that "the potential for unfair prejudice, etc., posed by 
the admission of various types of expert scientific evidence can vary widely and 
must be considered in making the helpfulness determination." Id. The Court 
observed that "[ajmong the important variables are the nature of the evidence 
offered, the quality of the other evidence available to the finder of fact, and the 
centrality of the issue to which the scientific evidence is directed." Id. 
Rimmasch explained that "if the scientific proof is based on undeniably 
valid scientific premises, has a high degree of power to accurately determine the 
existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue, and is easily replicable and its 
application to similar situations has been tested and validated often, then the 
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dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, etc., 
attendant to its introduction would have to be great indeed to preclude its 
admission/' Id. On the other hand, "if there [are] weaknesses in the testimony 
on some or all of these points, then it would be relatively easier to show that the 
dangers of admission outweighed the probativeness of the testimony/' Id. 
Expert testimony on eyewitness identification generally falls in the latter 
category. Although the methodology used in the research is generally sound, it 
cannot reliably predict "the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue/' i.e., 
whether the identification of a particular witness was or was not accurate. As 
observed by one researcher, "no general theory of memory exists that could 
allow deductions of particular performance of particular witnesses in particular 
cases." Brian R. Clifford, A Commentary on Ebbesen and Konecni's 'Eyewitness 
memory research: Probative v. prejudicial value', 5 Expert Evidence 140,140 (Dec. 
1997). 
Rimmasch also explained that "when the principles underlying scientific 
evidence are easily demonstrable or are readily understood by lay persons, there 
is relatively less danger that the finder of fact will be confused by the 
presentation or unduly impressed with the apparent 'scientific' nature of the 
evidence." Id. In that case, courts may be justified in admitting "evidence with 
relatively less probative power." Id. In contrast, "'when the nature of the 
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technique is more esoteric, as with some statistical analyses and seriologic tests, 
or when the inferences from the scientific evidence sweep broadly or cut deeply 
into sensitive areas, a stronger showing of probative value should be required/ 
Such a 'sensitive area' is one central to the core of the fact-finding process — 
whether one witness or another is telling the truth." Id. (citation omitted). 
Once again, expert testimony on eyewitness identification falls in this 
latter category. As explained by the Nebraska Supreme Court, "the knowledge 
of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists, is probabilistic, couched in terms 
of averages, standard deviations, curves, and differences between groups/ ' 
State v. Trevino, 432 N.W.2d 503, 518 (Neb. 1988). Courts must therefore be 
careful to ensure that statistical probabilities not be used to predict the reliability 
of a particular identification. As observed by this Court in State v. Rammel, 
"courts have routinely excluded [such evidence] when [it] invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze 
the evidence before it and decide where [the] truth lies/7 721 P.2d 498,501 (Utah 
1986). 
Expert testimony on eyewitness identification also "cut[s] deeply into 
sensitive areas" — whether a witness accurately identified the perpetrator of the 
crime. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. The rules do not prohibit expert testimony 
that "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact/' Utah R. 
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Evid. 703. However, when expert testimony based on statistical findings is 
offered on such sensitive areas, Rimmasch requires a "stronger showing of 
probative value/7 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. As explained in Rammel, 
"[probabilities cannot conclusively establish that a single event did or did not 
occur and are particularly inappropriate when used to establish facts 'not 
susceptible to quantitative analysis/ such as whether a particular individual is 
telling the truth at any given time," or in this case, whether a particular 
individual accurately identified the perpetrator. Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501 (citation 
omitted). 
This is not to say that expert testimony on eyewitness identification 
should necessarily be excluded. See Clifford, supra, at 140 ("the lack of theory is 
not, in and of itself, totally crippling"). But when admitted, courts must 
recognize the limitations of the science. For example, research studies on the CA 
correlation "do not demonstrate that every eyewitness's confidence in the 
accuracy of his or her testimony is misplaced." Jones v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143,148 
(Ga. 2000). "Instead, the studies depict 'group character' behavior, offering [to 
the jury] expert information 'about how groups of people perceive and react as a 
basis for evaluating the claims of an eyewitness in a particular case/" Id. 
(quoting Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and 
Evidence Law, 46 Duke L.J. 461, 491, 504 (1996)). 
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As noted, "the quality of the other evidence available to the finder of fact" 
is also an important factor in determining the helpfulness of expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. In cases like this, 
where the eyewitness identification is substantially corroborated by other 
evidence, see infra, at 40-45, the helpfulness of the testimony is greatly 
diminished and its potential for confusion of the issues is greatly increased. 
Under such circumstances, courts may appropriately rely on Long instructions. 
As observed by the California Supreme Court, expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification "will not often be needed, and in the usual case the appellate court 
will continue to defer to the trial court's discretion in this matter." People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984). 
C. In most cases, Long instructions can adequately educate jurors on 
the factors that might affect eyewitness identifications. 
Before applying the standard to the facts of this case, a final comment on 
the effectiveness of Long instructions is in order. Where expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification is permitted, a Long instruction that does no more than 
reiterate that testimony is unnecessary and inappropriate. However, where 
expert testimony is not allowed, courts should still be required to give a Long 
instruction "whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and 
such an instruction is requested by the defense." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
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Defendant's claim that expert testimony should be presumptively 
admissible in eyewitness identification cases rests on the premise that Long 
instructions do not adequately educate jurors on the problems associated with 
eyewitness identifications. See Cert. Pet. at 20-27,36. He argues that "[bjecause 
a [cautionary] jury instruction 'points only to certain factors without explaining 
the relative impact those factors have on memory or identification accuracy/ an 
instruction is only 'minimally effective.'" Cert. Pet. at 22 (citation omitted). He 
claims that expert testimony is more effective than jury instructions "[b]ecause 
[it] will 'focus[ ] the jury's attention on those factors most likely to affect the 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification.'" Cert. Pet. at 22 (citation omitted). 
The premise of Defendant's claim is unfounded. 
As noted, the Court in Long did not prescribe the Long instruction, but 
held that trial court and counsel should formulate instructions that reflected 
both the science and the facts of the particular case. Long, 472 P.2d at 492, 495. 
The Court expressed the hope that "over time, the lessons of experience" would 
produce instructions that more fully satisfied the concerns expressed by the 
Court. Id. at 495. Sixteen years after Long was decided, the Court in Hubbard 
again urged courts and counsel to formulate instructions that reflect the research 
and the facts of the particular case: 
If the trial court determines that the better result would be to 
educate the jury through a Long instruction, counsel are certainly 
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able to present proposed Long instructions that explain the 
potential effects on certain circumstances on the powers of 
observation and recollection and present their positions on how the 
Long cautionary instruction should be given. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ 19. Hubbard held that such instructions may "explain[ ] 
the substance of the proffered expert testimony, namely the research and 
scientific principles underlying the limitations of eyewitness identification/7 Id. 
Defendant, however, made no effort to do so and acquiesced to the giving 
of Instruction 35A on eyewitness identification, which was nearly identical to 
the standard Long instruction. See R. 647: 527-28; R. 594-96. Indeed, when asked 
whether there were any objections to the proposed instructions, defense counsel 
objected only to Instruction 45. R. 647: 527-28. He cannot now complain that the 
instruction was inadequate because it failed to better explain factors most likely 
to affect the eyewitness identification in this case. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, If 54,70 P.3d 111 (holding that defendant invited any error in the instruction 
where he affirmed on the record he had no objection to the instructions). 
Defendant nevertheless contends that research shows that a cautionary 
instruction is only "'minimally effective/" and that "some research 
demonstrates no beneficial effect from jury instructions/' Cert Pet. at 22 
(quoting Stephen D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and 
Jury Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. 43, 52 (1989)). Specifically, he 
points to Penrod and Cutler's conclusion, based on a review of several 
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experiments, "that there is little evidence that judges' instructions roncerning 
the reliability of eyewitness identification enhance juror sensitivity to eyewitness 
identification evidence/" Cert. Pet. at 22-23 (quoting Brian L. Cutler & Stephen 
D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: Hie Eyewitness, Psychology, and tlte Law 255,263 
(1995)). An examination of their report, however, reveals that the findings are 
insufficient to support a rejection of the cautionary instructions as a means of 
educating juries about the factors affecting eyewitness identifications. 
The Cutler, Dexter, and Penrod study in 1990 tested the Telfaire instruction 
to determine whether it influenced the manner in which jurors evaluated the 
eyewitness identification process. Cutler & Penrod, supra, at 257. The Zemba 
and Geiselman study in 1993 examined the Telfaire instruction to determine 
whether it was more effective if given before and after eyewitness testimony. Id. 
at 258-59. The Greene study in 1998 also examined the Telfaire instruction. Id. at 
259-60. All of these studies concluded that the Telfaire instruction was 
ineffective. See id. at 257-60. 
The Katzev & Wishart study in 1985 involved 108 subjects (comprising 30 
juries) to test the effectiveness of an instruction that commented on the 
psychological findings regarding eyewitness identification. Cutler & Penrod, 
supra, at 257. That study revealed that the instruction produced skepticism 
(fewer guilty verdicts), but it could not determine whether the instruction also 
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increased sensitivity (greater awareness of eyewitness factors). Id. Greene also 
conducted an experiment using an instruction that was similar to the Long 
instruction or a modified Long instruction. Cutler & Penrod, supra, at 260-61. 
That study involved 139 subjects and found that the instruction produced 
increased skepticism, but reduced sensitivity. Id. 
From these studies, Cutler and Penrod conclude that cautionary 
instructions "do not serve as an effective safeguard against mistaken 
identifications and convictions and that expert testimony is therefore more 
effective than judge's instructions as a safeguard/' Id. at 264. However, a 
majority of these studies tested the effectiveness of the Telfaire instruction. 
Accordingly, they shed little light on the effectiveness of the standard Long 
instruction, which "remedies many of the problems of the Telfaire instruction/' 
not to mention a modified Long instruction. Long, 721 P.2d at 493-94. The other 
two studies involving less than a total of 250 subjects can hardly be regarded as 
sufficient to conclude that a modified Long instruction is not adequate. Indeed, 
the author of the Greene study appears to have come to the opposite conclusion 
of Cutler and Penrod, concluding that the study "suggests] that jurors who 
heard the revised instruction were better able to appreciate and understand" the 
relevant factors affecting eyewitness identifications. Edith Greene, Eyewitness 
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Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instructions, 8 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 15,18-19 
(1987). 
In sum, the research falls far short of supporting Defendant's premise that 
cautionary instructions cannot adequately educate the jury on the factors 
affecting eyewitness identifications. 
D. The court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification. 
Applying the abuse of discretion standard, as governed by rule 702, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. 
Step One. The State did not challenge the inherent reliability of the 
scientific principles underlying Dr. Dodd's testimony. Accordingly step one of 
the three-prong Rimmasch test was satisfied. 
Step Two. In his statement summarizing his proposed testimony, Dr. 
Dodd opined that "the identification by Ms. Pantoja at the showup is based on 
the fact that the perpetrator was dressed in red and that the subsequent 
identifications might be based on previous identifications rather than a memory 
for a person encoded at the time of the crime." R. 263. The State objected to this 
proffered testimony on the ground that it was "commenting on the eyewitness's 
credibility/' R. 639: 15. And indeed, such proffered testimony would 
improperly "evaluate for the jury . . . to what extent [Pantoja's] testimony 
-39-
should be believed/7 Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, % 15; accord Utah R. Evid. 702 
(November 1,2007), Committee Advisoiy Note (observing that expert testimony 
on general principles should not "attempt[ ] to apply th[o]se principles to the 
specific facts of the case"). Defense counsel correctly conceded the point and 
"withdr[e]w that particular aspect" of the proffered testimony. R. 639: 19. 
The remainder of the proffered testimony would have discussed general 
principles regarding the effects of trauma, weapon use, cross-racial 
identification, and suggestive influences such as show-ups and police 
commentary. The court of appeals held that because the proffered testimony 
was in the nature of a lecture to the jury, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in relying instead on the Long instruction, despite any inadequacies in 
the instruction in this particular case. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, ^  18,21. The 
court's holding is consistent with this Court's precedent. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 
45, f % 18-19 (holding that where testimony would amount to a lecture to the 
jury, counsel may request instructions that explain factors relevant to the case). 
In light of this Court's decision in Rothlisberger and the Advisory 
Committee Note to rule 702, as amended November 1, 2007, see supra, at 28-29, 
refusal to allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification because it is in the 
nature of a lecture to the jury may no longer be appropriate on tlwt basis alone. 
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The trial in this case, however, was before these developments and Defendant 
cannot therefore benefit from any such post-trial changes in the law. 
Step Three. Finally, the expert testimony would not "on balance, . . . be 
helpful to the finder of fact" under the circumstances of this case. Rimniasch, 775 
P.2d at 398 n.8. As noted, expert testimony of this nature requires "a stronger 
showing of probative value." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). In this case, 
the Long instruction directed the jury to consider "the stress or fright at the time 
of observation," "the presence . . . of distracting . . . activity during the 
observation," and whether the identification was "was completely the product 
of the witness's own memory." R. 594-95. It also instructed the jury that cross-
racial identifications "may be less reliable" and that identifications by picking 
someone from a group are "generally more reliable than an identification made 
from the defendant being presented alone to the witness." R. 595-96. In short, 
the Long instruction discussed the factors which Dr. Dodd proposed to discuss. 
As in Hubbard, the instructions "could have better explained the substance 
of the proffered expert testimony, namely the research and scientific principles 
underlying the limitations of eyewitness identification." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, f^ 
19. Defendant had the opportunity to propose a more complete instruction, but 
told the court he had no issues with the instruction. R. 647: 527-28. He thus 
invited any error. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54. 
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In this case, however, the most relevant factor in determining the overall 
helpfulness of the expert testimony was "the quality of the other evidence 
available to the finder of fact." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8. 
As observed by the court of appeals, none of the three witnesses that 
identified Defendant as the gunman were complete strangers. See Clopten, 2008 
UT App 205, Tf 20. Shannon Pantoja and Melissa Valdez interacted, at some 
level, with Defendant earlier in the evening. Before the concert, Defendant was 
named and pointed out to Pantoja. R. 645:35-26. Valdez spoke with Defendant 
before the concert. R. 646: 243-47. She then passed him moments before the 
shooting, asked if he got tickets, and received an affirmative response. R. 646: 
246-49. Although he did not make eye contact, Valdez "looked Mm in his eyes." 
R. 646: 246. After passing him, Valdez looked over her shoulder in time to see 
him shoot Fuailemaa from behind. R. 646: 249-51. 
The most damming aspect of these two witnesses' testimony, however, 
was in their description of the shooter's clothing, not in their facial 
identification. Even assuming Dr. Dodd's testimony would have undermined 
the two witnesses' facial identification of Clopten as the shooter, it would not 
have undermined the witnesses' account that the shooter was wearing all red. 
When Officer Saul Bailey responded to the scene seconds after the shooting, 
Pantoja pointed toward the fleeing shooter and said, "It's the guy in all red." R. 
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645:46; accord R. 646:195,224-25,236. Valdez also testified that the shooter was 
wearing a red hooded sweatshirt and red sweatpants, "like a matching outfit/7 
R. 646: 246-47; R. 646: 263-64. She testified that the outfit "looked brand new" 
and that "[i]t was all fluffy." R. 646: 247. 
As Dr. Dodd indicated in his summary of proposed testimony, the 
research upon which expert testimony relies has called into question the 
reliability of facial identification, not the ability of witnesses to identify other 
aspects of a perpetrator, such as what the perpetrator was wearing. To the 
contrary, Dr. Dodd himself explained that "[witnesses can quickly pick up 
certain particulars: this was a male of a certain size, wearing particular clothing, 
engaged in particular activities such as holding a weapon." R. 260-61 (Letter of 
Dr. Dodd submitted with Notice of Expert Witness) (emphasis added). Thus, 
even if neither witness had been able to identify the shooter's face, both testified 
that he was wearing all red. 
After Pantoja pointed toward the fleeing shooter and said he was wearing 
all red, Bailey looked and saw a man wearing all red running eastbound, just 
beginning to round a corner midway through the block. R. 646:195,227. Bailey 
pursued the man until he fled in a Ford Explorer. R. 646:196-202. At that point, 
officers in vehicles gave chase, eventually stopping the Ford Explorer at an exit 
ramp on 1-15. R. 645: 113-21. Although Freddie White was wearing a red T-
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shirt, Clopten was the only occupant wearing red sweat pants and a red 
sweatshirt with a hood—just as the two e}^ e witnesses described. R. 645:121; R. 
646: 211-14. Thus, even absent a facial identification by the two witnesses, the 
evidence was strong that Clopten was the shooter. 
Even more probative was the testimony of one of Defendant's associates 
that night—Andre Hamby. He explained in detail the events leading up to the 
shooting. He testified that when the four men returned to their car after leaving 
the concert, Clopten angrily declared that he was "goin' to shoot [Fuailemaa]" 
and secured a 9 mm semi-automatic pistol from Freddie White. R. 633: 23,47-
48, 59. Hamby testified that Clopten then walked back toward the club, 
followed by Hamby, White, and Grissett. R. 633: 23, 59. Hamby testified that 
after he and the other two men fell back a short distance away, Clopten 
approached Fuailemaa and his girlfriend "and, at point-blank range, . . . shot 
[Fuailemaa] in the back of the head/ ' R. 633:23,26-28,50-52; SE45. This was no 
stranger account, but a personal account of someone who was immediately 
involved. 
Hamby's testimony that Defendant used a 9 mm handgun and had it 
thrown out the window during the high speed chase was also corroborated 
when the gun was found and a ballistics test confirmed that the shell casings 
and bullet fragment came from that weapon. R. 645:162,169-76; R. 646: 377-80. 
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Finally, the case against Defendant was further corroborated by the 
testimony of Robert Land, an inmate at the prison who spoke with Defendant at 
the prison following Defendant's arrest for Fuailemaa's murder. R. 646: 341, 
365. Land explained that Defendant considered Fuailemaa an enemy because he 
had jumped Defendant during a fight at the prison in 1997. R. 646: 347-51. He 
testified that after Defendant was imprisoned following his arrest, Defendant 
told him what had happened. Confirming the observations of police officers 
and Hamby, Defendant told Land that he and Fuailemaa confronted each other 
earlier that night at the club. R. 646: 346. Defendant said that during the 
confrontation, he told Fuailemaa that he "better go call his mom because that's 
the last time he'll talk to her/ ' R. 646: 346. Defendant told Land that he 
"domed" Fuailemaa after he left the concert. R. 646: 352.9 He also told Land 
that they threw the guns out the window during the high-speed chase. R. 646: 
353. 
In sum, expert testimony on the problems associated with facial 
identification was not required here, because the identification rested as much 
on the shooter's clothing as it did on his face, if not more so. Police pursued and 
apprehended the man in all red, who turned out to be Clopten. Moreover, one 
9
 Land explained that to dome someone means to "[s]hoot him in the 
head." R. 646: 352. 
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of Clopten's three associates that night fingered him as the shooter, and there is 
no question that he was able to identify Clopten. Finally, Clopten admitted to 
the murder to a cellmate at the prison. Given "the quality of th[is] other 
evidence/7 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8., the proffered expert testimony was 
not, on balance, particularly helpful to the jury. 
Moreover, these corroborating facts render any possible error in excluding 
the testimony harmless, especially where the jury was given a cautionary Long 
instruction on the factors affecting eyewitness identifications. See Steffensen v. 
Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342,1347 (Utah 1993) (holding that any error 
in excluding expert testimony may be harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted March 12, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
^ F R E Y S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney Gener, 
Counsel for Appellee 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
%1 Deon Clopten appeals his conviction of murder, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2007) ; failure to respond to a police 
command, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210 (2005); and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 (2) (a) (2003).2 We affirm. 
BACKGROUND2 
f2 Tony Fuailemaa was shot and killed on December 1, 2002, 
shortly after leaving a concert in Salt Lake City with his 
girlfriend, Shannon Pantoja. 
%3 Clopten also attended the concert, along with three of his 
friends. Clopten was dressed in red pants and a red jacket or 
sweatshirt. Before the concert, Pantoja exchanged greetings with 
a member of Clopten's group. Once inside, Fuailemaa asked 
1. Because Clopten's arguments on appeal do not concern the 
statutory language, we cite to the current code as a convenience 
to the reader. 
2. "When reviewing a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to that verdict." State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 
59, H 3, 144 P.3d 1152. 
Pantoja if she knew the man in the red outfit.1 When Pantoja 
stated that she did not, Fuailemaa said the man's name was Deon 
Clopten. Fuailemaa explained that he and Clopten had been 
incarcerated together and that Clopten "had had some problems 
with some of the homies out in the prison." 
1|4 During the concert, four undercover police officers observed 
the crowd. " [T] he individual that was wearing the red suit" and 
his group "ha[d] some sort of a confrontation" with another group 
that included Fuailemaa and Pantoja. No physical blows resulted, 
and eventually the groups separated. Sometime later, but before 
the concert ended, Clopten and his group left. Shortly 
thereafter, Fuailemaa and Pantoja also left the concert. 
1)5 As Pantoja and Fuailemaa exited the concert, Pantoja saw 
three of the four men from Clopten's group. The three men "were 
kind of like hiding behind--crouched behind the building" and 
they "peeked out and then immedieitely ducked back again." 
Fuailemaa told Pantoja, "I think I'm going to have some problems 
with these guys." "Then, at that moment, that's when Deon 
Clo [pten] came out with his arm extended. He had a gun in his 
hand." Pantoja heard the shooter say, "What's up now," and then 
she watched as Clopten shot Fuailemaa twice in the head. Clopten 
then ran away. 
1[6 After hearing gun shots, one of the undercover officers 
attending the concert ran to Pantoja and asked, "Who did it?" 
Pantoja answered by saying, "It's the guy in all red." After the 
police arrested Clopten and his group, Pantoja identified Clopten 
as the shooter. Pantoja told the officer that the shooter's name 
was "Deon Compton." More than one year later, Pantoja again 
identified Clopten as the shootei: during a police lineup. 
Pantoja also identified Clopten as the shooter during his trial. 
H7 Melissa Valdez also attended the concert and witnessed 
Fuailemaa's murder. Before the concert, Valdez talked to a group 
of men about getting tickets. One of the men was wearing red 
pants and a red sweatshirt. Like Fuailemaa and Pantoja, Valdez 
left the concert shortly before it was finished. As she was 
leaving the venue, she saw the man in the red sweat suit that she 
had spoken with earlier. She asked the man if he had obtained 
tickets, and the man indicated that he had and passed by her. 
Shortly thereafter, Valdez happened to look back over her 
shoulder. At that moment, she saw the man in red standing behind 
the victim with his right arm extended and holding what appeared 
to be a gun, and heard a gunshot. When presented with a photo 
array, Valdez twice identified Clopten as the shooter. She also 
identified Clopten as the shooter during his trial. 
H8 Andre Christopher Hamby, who attended the concert with 
Clopten and witnessed Fuailemaa's murder, also testified against 
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Clopten.3 Hamby testified that he, Clopten, and two other men 
approached their vehicle after they left the concert and that 
Clopten declared, "I'm goin' shoot him." At that point, Clopten 
told another member of the group to "[h]and me the gun." Hamby 
watched as Clopten obtained the gun, threw on the hood of his red 
sweatshirt, walked up to Fuailemaa, put the gun straight behind 
Fuailemaa's head, and, "at point-blank range," shot him twice "in 
the back of the head." Hamby then ran back to the vehicle with 
the rest of the group; once everyone was in, Clopten "took off" 
driving. Clopten then passed his gun to another member of the 
group "and told him to throw it out" the window. 
f9 Finally, Robert Land testified that Clopten admitted to the 
murder. Land knew Clopten because they previously had been 
cellmates. Land and Clopten were reunited in December of 2002 
while Clopten was being held in prison for the current offense. 
It was during this period that Clopten bragged to Land about 
committing the murder. 
HlO The defense sought to introduce reasonable doubt that 
Clopten was the shooter. As acknowledged on appeal, its "theory 
of the case was misidentification or mistaken identity." 
Accordingly, the defense presented testimony that a different 
individual had admitted to being the shooter and that the man in 
red had entered the passenger's side of the vehicle, as opposed 
to the driver's side. The defense also sought to present expert 
testimony regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification. 
The trial court excluded the testimony, but instructed the jury 
regarding this issue. 
Ull After hearing all of the evidence, the jury convicted 
Clopten of murder, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2007) , 
and failure to respond to a police command, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6a-210 (2005) . Defense counsel submitted the charge for 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person to the trial 
court, which found him guilty, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503 (2) (a) (2003) . Clopten now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
fl2 Clopten presents two issues on appeal. First, Clopten 
argues the trial court erred when it excluded expert testimony 
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification. "'The 
trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility 
of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, we will not 
reverse [a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony] unless 
3. Because Hamby was unavailable at the time of trial, his 
preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. 
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the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" State v. 
Hollen, 2002 UT 35, % 66, 44 P.3d 794 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)). 
Second, Clopten argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. "Ineffective assistance of counsel arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness as a matter 
of law." State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215, 1 9, 164 P.3d 1258, 
cert, denied, No. 20070653, 2007 Utah Lexis 225 (Nov. 29, 2007) . 
ANALYSIS 
I. Expert Testimony 
Ul3 Clopten first argues the trial court erred when it excluded 
the testimony of Dr. Dodd, an expert witness prepared to testify 
about the fallibility of eyewitness identification. Because of 
the highly deferential standard of review on this issue, we 
affirm the trial court's ruling. 
i[l4 "' [T]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification.'" State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 
(Utah 1986) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 
(1967)). Indeed, M[t]he literature is replete with empirical 
studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification[, and t]here is no significant division of opinion 
on the issue. The studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that human perception is inexact and that human memory is both 
limited and fallible.1' Id. at 488 (citations omitted). 
Ul5 However, "jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems." Id. at 490. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
declared "that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the 
jury in evaluating such testimony is warranted." Id. at 492. 
Thus, in the absence of any reasonable tactic explaining 
otherwise, effective assistance requires that defense counsel 
request a cautionary jury instruction. See id.; State v. Maestas 
(Maestas I), 1999 UT 32, ^ 32 & n.2, 37, 984 P.2d 376. 
1l6 In this case, the trial court gave a specific jury 
instruction regarding the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification. The jury instruction was adopted almost verbatim 
from an instruction the supreme court has identified as 
"satisfy [ing the] expressed concerns about the need for 
cautionary instructions." See Long, 721 P.2d at 494-95 & n.8. 
Clopten does not appeal his conviction based on that 
instruction.4 Instead, Clopten argues the trial court erred when 
4. Clopten does contend the jury "instruction lack[ed] several 
(continued...) 
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it excluded expert testimony that would have elaborated on the 
fallibility of such identification and specifically addressed 
some of the relevant factors in this case. 
1fl7 Although the supreme court created a "rigorous approach to 
cautionary [jury] instructions," id. at 488, a majority of the 
court has not required the admission of expert witness testimony, 
see generally, e.g., State v. Maestas (Maestas II), 2002 UT 123, 
H 57, 63 P.3d 621 (plurality opinion). Instead, the supreme 
court "'recognize[s] that whether to allow proffered expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification testimony is a 
matter best left to the trial court's discretion.'" Id. ^ 68 
(Durrant, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 
H 14, 48 P.3d 953); accord id. K 136 (Russon, J., dissenting); 
State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, H 66, 44 P.3d 794. Thus, "the trial 
court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony 
[regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification] will 
stand unless the ruling 'exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" 
Maestas II, 2002 UT 123, f 136 (Russon, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Hollen, 2002 UT 35, % 66).5 
118 In State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953, the supreme 
court affirmed "the trial court's exclusion of the proffered 
expert testimony regarding the dangers and fallibility of 
eyewitness identification." Id. H 13. In that case, "the trial 
court gave a cautionary [jury] instruction instead of permitting 
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification." Id. % 19. 
Although the supreme court found shortcomings with the cautionary 
instruction, it affirmed. See id. The court held that "expert 
testimony is the type of lecture testimony that, in cases such as 
these, can be adequately conveyed to the jury through an 
instruction." Id.; see also Maestas II, 2002 UT 123, % 138 
4. (...continued) 
important aspects" but limits any claimed error to the trial 
court's refusal to allow Dr. Dodd "to cover what was otherwise 
missing from the Long instruction." 
5. Clopten has not pointed us to a single case that has been 
reversed under this highly deferential standard of review. 
Indeed the appellate courts of this state have consistently 
affirmed trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification. See, e.g., Maestas 
U , 2002 UT 123, % 57, 63 P.3d 621 (plurality opinion) (affirming 
trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding fallibility 
of eyewitness identification); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^  
35, 48 P.3d 953 (same); State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, % 48, 
27 P.3d 1133 (same); State v. Brink, 2007 UT App 353, % 1, 173 
P.3d 183 (same); State v. Kinsev, 797 P.2d 424, 428-49 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (same). 
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(Russon, J., dissenting) (approving of a trial court's exclusion 
of expert testimony based on the defendant's ability to cross-
examine the witness and to "request an appropriate jury 
instruction"); State v. Brink, 2007 UT App 353, ^ 6, 11, 173 
P.3d 183 (affirming trial court's decision "to educate the jury 
through the use of appropriate instructions instead of through 
expert testimony" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
i|l9 Thus, we follow the precedent affording trial judges 
significant deference to exclude expert testimony on this topic. 
However, we note that courts and legal commentators have argued 
that jury instructions and cross-examinations do not adequately 
address the vagaries of eyewitness identification. See, e.g., 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("To the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great 
confidence in an inaccurate identification, cross-examination can 
hardly be seen as an effective waiy to reveal the weaknesses in a 
witness' recollection of an event."); Henry F. Fradella, Why 
Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony, Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2007) ("Jury 
instructions do not explain the complexities about perception and 
memory in a way a properly qualified person can. Expert 
testimony . . . can do that far better than being told the 
results of scientific research in a conclusory manner by a 
judge [,] especially since jury instructions are given far too 
late in a trial to help jurors evaluate relevant eyewitness 
testimony with information beyond their common knowledge." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard A. Wise et al. , 
A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 807, 833 (2007) ("[Jjudges1 instructions do not serve 
as an effective safeguard against mistaken identifications and 
convictions and . . . expert testimony is therefore more 
effective than judges' instructions as a safeguard." (omission in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jacqueline 
McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1271, 1277 (2005) ("Although 
cross-examination is a powerful tool for exposing lies, it is not 
particularly effective when used against eyewitnesses who believe 
they are telling the truth."); Michael R. Leippe, The Case for 
Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & 
L. 909, 924 (1995) ("Finally, judge's cautionary instructions 
also are no panacea. Current versions are inaccurate, overly 
broad, and easily lost amid a lengthy presentation of other 
closing instructions. Moreover, research . . . suggests 
instructions do not effectively teach jurors about how to 
evaluate eyewitness testimony." (citations omitted)); Cindy J. 
O'Hagan, Note, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. L.J. 741, 754-55 (1993) 
("Jury instructions should not be abandoned; they do have some 
value. But in some instances, courts have used jury instructions 
as an excuse to exclude expert testimony, claiming it is 
redundant. Because expert testimony is a more effective 
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solution, jury instructions should be used as a complement to the 
expert testimony, not as a substitute." (footnote omitted)); 
Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eves Deceive You? Expert 
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 994-95 (1976) (" [T]he 
witness on cross-examination will not and cannot reveal the 
factors that may have biased the identification, for many of 
these influences operate unconsciously."); id. at 1002-05 
("Although special cautionary instructions regarding the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony take a step in the right 
direction, they probably do not provide much protection against 
conviction of the innocent."). 
i|20 The precise situation in this case is somewhat different 
than the cases discussed in these articles. Three of the 
eyewitnesses here were not complete strangers to Clopten at the 
time of the shooting. Hamby attended the concert with Clopten, 
saw the murder, and rode with Clopten in the get-away vehicle. 
Valdez had a conversation with Clopten earlier in the evening. 
Moments before the shooting, Valdez recognized Clopten and made a 
reference to the prior conversation which he acknowledged. She 
then heard the shots and turned her head in time to see Clopten 
holding the gun that had just been fired into the victim's head. 
Finally, the victim's girlfriend, Pantoja, learned Clopten's 
name, observed the confrontation between her date and Clopten 
earlier in the evening, saw Clopten shoot Fuailemaa, and 
identified the shooter to police by description and by name. She 
then identified him again at the time of his arrest one year 
later during an in-person lineup, and during his trial. 
Consequently, even if admission of expert testimony on this issue 
were required, we would conclude there was no prejudicial error 
in this case. 
i[21 Following existing Utah precedent, we hold the trial court 
did not exceed its discretion when it excluded Dr. Dodd's 
testimony. The trial court carefully and repeatedly considered 
the proposed testimony, the facts of this case, and the 
cautionary jury instructions.6 Ultimately, the trial court 
excluded the testimony because "the eyewitness [jury] instruction 
does an adequate job" and because the trial court thought "that 
Dr. Dodd's testimony . . . would only confuse the issue." 
6. The trial court considered Dr. Dodd's testimony at least four 
times. Clopten argues the trial court "flip flopped" on the 
issue and therefore its final ruling demonstrates an abuse of 
discretion. We disagree. The trial court's final ruling was 
well-reasoned and does not exceed its allowed discretion. 
Moreover, we will not fault the trial court for reconsidering a 
difficult and important issue in an attempt to reach the most 
appropriate result. 
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Indeed, the trial court ruled "Dr. Dodd's testimony [wa]s just 
superfluous and would have no bearing on the jury's decision." 
The trial court's reasoning essentially mirrors that affirmed by 
the supreme court in Hubbard. See 2002 UT 45, K 19 ("In this 
case the trial court gave a cautionary Long instruction instead 
of permitting expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification."). Given the unique facts of this case, the 
controlling legal precedent, and the deferential standard of 
review, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
iJ22 Clopten next argues his trial counsel was ineffective 
because counsel failed to obtain certain documents detailing an 
alleged sentence reduction Land obtained in exchange for his 
testimony implicating Clopten and because counsel failed to 
request a jury instruction of manslaughter. We are not 
convinced. 
1J2 3 "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that 
but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, H 38, 122 P.3d 543 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Clopten must 
overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
|^24 In this case, Clopten's trial counsel adequately cross-
examined Land about his reduced sentence. During cross-
examination, Land admitted that he had been facing federal 
charges that carried a potential life sentence and that he met 
with federal authorities to discuss testifying in this case. 
Land further acknowledged that, after "[he] agreed to testify 
against Deon Clopten," "when [he] got sentenced, [he] got eight 
years."7 Moreover, Clopten's trial counsel read from the 
transcript of Land's interview with the federal authorities. The 
transcript demonstrated that Land was testifying against Clopten 
to obtain a reduced sentence in his federal case. In addition, 
Clopten's trial counsel reiterated during closing arguments that 
"Land is in the business of making deals to testify against other 
people" and that "by testifying in this case," Land's federal 
sentence was reduced. 
7. Land had previously arranged a deal that would reduce the 
sentence to fifteen years. After he agreed to testify against 
Clopten, his sentence was further reduced to eight years. 
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i|25 Clopten's trial counsel effectively questioned Land's 
veracity. Although additional documents from the federal court 
may have provided further evidence of Land's motives, Land's 
testimony at trial, the transcript read into the record, and 
counsel's closing arguments convince us that Clopten's trial 
counsel was not ineffective and that the outcome of the trial 
would not have been any different with these documents. 
Accordingly, we affirm on this issue. 
|^26 Likewise, we reject Clopten's argument that his counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a 
manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense to murder. 
[W]hen a defendant requests a jury 
instruction on a lesser included offense, the 
evidence-based standard requires that the 
instruction be given when the trial court 
determines that (1) the lesser offense is 
"included" in the offense charged, and (2) 
there is evidence to justify acquittal of the 
greater offense and conviction of the lesser 
offense. 
State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, H 15, 6 P.3d 1116. 
f27 Assuming manslaughter is a lesser included offense of 
murder, counsel was not ineffective for refusing to request an 
instruction in this case. Failure to raise a meritless legal 
argument does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ 26, 
1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
|^28 Here, there was no evidence to justify acquittal of the 
greater offense and conviction of the lesser offense. In Utah, 
"[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor . . . 
recklessly causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205 (2003). Conduct is reckless if the actor "is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Id. § 76-2-
103(3) (Supp. 2007). On the other hand, "[c]riminal homicide 
constitutes murder if . . . the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another." Id. § 76-5-203 (2) (a) . Conduct is 
intentional when the conduct or result of such conduct "is [the 
actor's] conscious objective or desire." Id. § 76-2-103(1). 
Likewise, an actor engages in conduct knowingly "when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. 
§ 76-2-103 (2) . 
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1f2 9 The evidence at trial indicated that the shooter saw the 
victim and announced, "I'm goin' to shoot him." The perpetrator 
then cocked the gun, "walked up on [the victim] close and, at 
point-blank range, he shot him [twice] in the back of the head" 
in "an execution type shooting." The shooting was "[v]ery 
quickly lethal." Indeed, Clopten concedes that "[t]he manner of 
[the victim's] death is not in dispute." Given these undisputed 
facts, there simply is no evidence to suggest that the shooter, 
whoever he was, did not act knowingly or intentionally when he 
marched up to the victim and shot him twice at point-blank range 
in the back of the head. Accordingly, any request for a 
manslaughter instruction would have been meritless under the 
circumstances. Counsel was not ineffective for refusing to make 
a futile request. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ 26. 
CONCLUSION 
[^3 0 Because the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Dodd's 
testimony and because Clopten did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we affirm. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
H31 I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
THORNE, Judge (concurring): 
i[32 I concur in the thoughtful analysis, as well as the result, 
of the majority opinion. However, I write separately to suggest 
that in light of the persuasive authorities cited by the majority 
in explaining the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, the time 
has come to revisit the boundaries of trial court discretion in 
excluding expert testimony on the subject. Such a decision is 
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not for this court to make, but I would urge the Utah Supreme 
Court to consider mandating the admission of such testimony in 
appropriate cases. 
1|33 As explained in detail in State v. Long, 721 P. 2d 483 (Utah 
1986), eyewitness testimony is subject to the inexact vagaries of 
human perception and memory and inevitably leads to mistaken 
identifications in a substantial number of cases. See id. at 
488-91. Not only are jurors largely unaware of the problems with 
eyewitness testimony, they may actually give it greater weight 
than other forms of evidence. I see little to lose and much to 
gain if criminal defendants are allowed to present expert 
testimony explaining how and why the eyewitness testimony in any 
particular case may be unreliable. This conclusion is only 
bolstered by the post-Long cases and articles cited by the 
majority. See, e.g., Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite 
Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 807, 
823-42 (2007) (arguing for admission of expert testimony when the 
primary or sole evidence against the defendant is eyewitness 
testimony). 
1134 While a Long instruction is certainly better than nothing in 
terms of ameliorating the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, 
it may not be as helpful to a jury as a live witness who can 
address the particular circumstances of any individual case. In 
appropriate cases, i.e., cases where the State's case rests 
substantially on eyewitness testimony, an expert's individualized 
critique of the circumstances may be both relevant and helpful to 
the jury. See Utah R. Evid. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."); id. R. 702(a) (stating that an expert may testify to 
specialized knowledge that "will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence"). Further, because the expert can 
specifically address the impact of the particular facts of the 
case on the reliability of the eyewitness testimony, expert 
testimony should not be considered merely cumulative to a Long 
instruction. Cf. id. R. 403 (allowing exclusion of cumulative 
evidence); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, H 17, 48 P.3d 953 ("[I]t 
is left to the trial court's sound discretion to decide whether 
the proffered expert testimony would constitute a lecture, the 
substance of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury 
through the judge in a jury instruction, as opposed to through 
expert testimony." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate that such evidence should be admitted absent some 
good reason for the trial court to exercise its discretion and 
exclude it. 
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f35 For the very reasons enunciated in the majority opinion, I 
urge the supreme court to revisit the issue of expert testimony 
in eyewitness cases. Nevertheless, the majority opinion 
faithfully implements the law as it currently stands, and under 
the current state of the law I concur in that opinion in all 
respects. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
20060254-CA 12 
ADDENDUM li 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
& Advisory Committee Note 
Utah R. Evid. 702 [February 2006 version] 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
* * * 
Utah R. Evid. 702 [Amended effective November 1, 2007.] 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying 
the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of 
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community. 
Advisory Committee Note, 
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal 
Rule 702 as it appeared before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 amendment to the Rule added 
that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended 
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in 
many respects the developments in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 
amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and federal approaches to 
expert testimony. 
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to 
be applied to all expert testimony. In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced 
in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like its federal counterpart, 
Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable 
expert testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront 
proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so 
rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or methods that 
are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The 
rational skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is 
mindful that several principles, methods or techniques may be suitably reliable to merit 
admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of knowledge which 
may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to 
all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a 
person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education". Finally, the 
gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular proposition 
that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as 
focusing on the "work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered 
expert testimony reliably addresses the "work at hand", and that the foundation of reliability 
presented for it reflects that consideration. 
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. 
Generally accepted principles and methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The 
nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It might be important in some 
cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to 
apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on 
the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the 
trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony that seeks to set out 
relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how they 
should be applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for 
admission under section (c) than case specific opinion testimony. There are, however, 
scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of considerable operational 
detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c). 
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel 
vs. non-novel dichotomy that has served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 
jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under section (c) 
does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability 
under section (b) must be shown by other means. 
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained 
in the federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent 
of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold" showing. That "threshold" requires 
only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible, 
not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, 
rules that an expert's testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory 
expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is 
the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise. Contrary and 
inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to 
reconcile—or choose between—the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not 
intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every expert, 
and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for the 
trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, 
admissibility under the rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared 
pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda of counsel. 
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inmate LineUp Record of: 09-23-2004 
LineUp Record No: 
LineUp Frame PIN Number Booking Number Suspect Name 
#1 
#2 
#3 
#4 
#5 
#6 
0413352 IBARRA, MICHAEL JEROME 
0309794 EDWARDS, FREDERICK JASON 
0328366 HEADLEY, GARY LYNN 
0227629 CLOPTEN, DEON LOMAX 
0318723 JOHNSON, NATHAN ANDREW 
0411536 OGLESBY, DAN DAVE 
Suspect DOB 
12/12/1977 
04/18/1977 
10/24/1978 
12/03/1975 
07/15/1978 
01/25/1980 
Search Criteria used to prepare this LineUp: 
Race: 
Gender 
Age: 
Height: 
Weight: 
Hair Color: 
Hair Style: 
Eye Color 
Eye Glasses: 
Build: 
Complexion: 
Facial Hair: 
Dexterity: 
Marks: 
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